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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AND CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
 
Despite continued polarization along political party lines, it remains unclear how 
differences in political ideology impact the choices consumers make. The results of seven 
studies indicate that political ideology profoundly influences the way consumers think and 
behave. Liberals and conservatives are systematically drawn to distinct choice preferences 
where liberals prefer hedonic, novel, and desirable options, while conservatives prefer 
utilitarian, status quo, and feasible options. These findings are robust for multiple measures 
of political ideology across multiple choice sets. Differences in behavior are explained by the 
amount of deliberation used for a given decision. Liberals deliberate more than conservatives 
as they are more open to information while conservatives have a lower tolerance for 
ambiguous information. Implications for consumers, marketers, and policy makers are 
provided. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent research in psychology (McAdams et al. 2008; Nail et al. 2009), political 
science (Mondak and Halperin 2008), genetics (Alford, Funk, and Hibbing 2005; Kandler, 
Bleidorn, and Riemann 2012), and neurology (Kanai et al. 2011) have identified fundamental 
differences in the way people think and behave relative to their political ideology. Given 
these fundamental differences, it is likely that liberals and conservatives vary in the way they 
engage in various consumption behaviors. Yet, surprisingly little attention has focused on 
understanding how political ideology influences consumer decision making and behavior. 
For example, might liberals and conservatives choose different types of brands or products? 
Might they prefer certain attributes or features over others? If so, what underlying process 
can inform us about how these consumers think and make decisions? 
In this research, we investigate the role that political ideology has on consumer 
decision making by focusing on choice preferences, and identifying which products, brands, 
and features are more favored by liberals and conservatives, thereby revealing their 
underlying decision making. Furthermore, a conceptual model is developed that illustrates 
the unique influence of political ideology on decision making and presents the underlying 
psychological process driving their choices. Specifically, we examine how political ideology 
elicits differences in the amount of deliberation used when making decisions, mediating the 
relationship between ideology and decision outcomes.  
In the following sections, we discuss the role of political ideology in consumer 
behavior, uncover how deliberation underlies these differences, introduce different measures 
of political ideology, and provide empirical support across seven studies for our conceptual 
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model. Finally, we offer guidance for consumers, marketers, and policy makers to better 
understand how ideology impacts decision making.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
Political Ideology 
Political ideology is defined as the set of attitudes that explains how society should 
function in order to achieve social justice and social order (Jost 2006). Research indicates 
that political ideology is best conceptualized as a unidimensional construct with liberals on 
the left and conservatives the right (Jost 2009). While there has been an increase in 
ideological research across several disciplines, there has been little research in marketing 
focusing on political ideology, especially on behavioral differences between conservatives 
and liberals (Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013;Winterich, Zhang, and Mittal 2012). 
While recent research has been able to somewhat alter people’s political ideology 
temporarily (Nail et al. 2009; Eidelman et al. 2012), there is growing consensus that political 
ideology is innate and fundamental to the individual. For example, Kanai et al. (2011) 
discovered structural differences in the neurobiology of liberals and conservatives. They 
identified that the right amygdala, the area of the brain responsible for processing basic 
emotional information such as fear and uncertainty, leading to heightened aggression under 
threat, was significantly larger for conservatives than liberals. Conversely, liberals have a 
larger anterior cingulate cortex, the area of the brain responsible for overriding habitual 
processes, as well as tolerating ambiguity, uncertainty, and conflict. Moreover, classic twin 
studies reveal that monozygotic twins (genetically identical) are more similar in their 
political attitudes than dizygotic (non-identical) twins (Alford et al. 2005). Additionally, 
Hatemi and colleagues (2011) uncovered specific genetic markers that were predictive of 
political ideology. Results indicated that NMDA receptors were the most influential on 
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political ideology as they are related to the organization of thoughts, abstract thought, 
information processing, attitude formation, and are instrumental in childhood development. 
Consistent with this research, we examine political ideology as a generalized personality 
orientation (Kruglanski and Webster 1996) based in motivated social cognition, which 
provides the “lens” through which liberals and conservatives see the world.   
Behavioral research has also demonstrated fundamental differences between liberals 
and conservatives. Research on morality suggests that liberals are more likely than 
conservatives to value the principles of caring and reducing harm, while conservatives focus 
on loyalty, respecting authority, and maintaining purity (McAdams et al. 2008; Winterich et 
al. 2012). Liberal moral values are more focused on the individual as the sole evaluator of 
what is or is not moral, while conservative moral values look to established groups and 
institutions for cues on what is or is not moral (Graham, Haidt, and Nosek 2009). 
Other research has found that conservatives are more likely to avoid uncertainty, 
which reflects a tendency for conservatives to perceive ambiguous or uncertain situations and 
stimuli as threatening (Jost, Federico, and Napier 2009). Similarly, liberals are more tolerant 
of ambiguity than conservatives, allowing them to better cope with uncertainty, thereby 
mitigating its threat (Jost et al. 2003). Research also suggests that conservatives have a 
greater inclination toward dogmatic thinking than liberals (Kemmelmeier 2007). Dogmatism 
is characterized by black-and-white thinking (Rokeach 1960). Such thinking causes 
conservatives to avoid and ignore inconsistent information, while liberals, who are less 
dogmatic, are more likely to consider and integrate incongruent ideas and information 
(Davies 1998).  
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In contrast, liberals have been shown to score higher on personality measures 
assessing openness to experience (Kruglanski 2005; van Hiel, Kossowska, and Mervielde 
2000), which is characterized as having an active imagination and being intellectually 
curious (McCrae 1987). This is further evident from the results of a particularly inventive 
study which showed that liberals’ bedrooms are more likely to contain a large number of art 
supplies, travel information, cultural artifacts, and a wide variety of books (especially those 
about ethnic issues, music, and issues such as feminism) than conservatives (Carney et al. 
2008). 
Indeed, political ideology provides an informative and revealing view into the 
thoughts, feelings, motivations, and actions of consumers. These fundamental differences 
between liberals and conservatives are likely to have a substantial impact on their 
consumption decisions. Next, we introduce and hypothesize the process by which liberals 
and conservatives make decisions as consumers. Our conceptual model is displayed in figure 
2.1. 
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Figure 2.1 
CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF IDEOLOGICAL CONSUMER PREFERENCES 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Political Ideology and Deliberation 
 Research has suggested possible differences in deliberation for liberal and 
conservative ideologies. For example, Steenkamp, Hofstede, and Wedel (1999) found a 
negative link between those who avoid uncertainty (similar to conservative black and white 
thinking) and innovativeness (similar to liberal openness to information), which is 
characteristic of using less deliberation (Lambert-Pandraud and Laurent 2010). Uncertain 
situations tend to require complex and nuanced thinking, which is less comfortable to 
conservatives (Jost et al. 2007; Thorisdottir and Jost 2011). Instead, being more tolerant of 
ambiguity allows liberals to integrate nuanced information into decisions, leading to greater 
deliberation (Muthukrishnan and Kardes 2001). Moreover, the inclination toward dogmatic 
thinking is similar to having a need for closure, which causes consumers to “seize and 
freeze” (Jost et al. 2003; Kruglanski and Webster 1996). In turn, this causes consumers to 
make decisions with a sense of urgency, leading them to deliberate less during decision 
making. In contrast, openness to experience has been positively linked to need for cognition 
(Fleischhauer et al. 2010), which describes the tendency to enjoy and engage in effortful 
thought (Cacioppo and Petty 1982). Specifically, those high in openness to experience were 
found to deliberate more as they explored their environment to achieve a greater 
understanding of their surroundings.  
The fundamental differences attributable to one’s political ideology appear to be the 
result of an underlying tendency for conservatives and liberals to systematically vary in their 
levels of deliberation when making decisions, where deliberation refers to the amount a 
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consumer thinks when making a decision (Nordgren and Dijksterhuis 2009). Overall, we 
expect that liberals deliberate more when making decisions in an attempt to better understand 
their environment. On the other hand, conservatives are likely to deliberate less, and instead 
rely on the structure, rules, and their dogmatic thinking to mitigate uncertainty, threat, and 
other perceived risks in the environment when making decisions. These fundamental 
differences are anticipated to guide the choices that liberals and conservatives make as 
consumers. Thus, it is predicted that: 
 
 
H1: Political ideology will positively influence consumers’ deliberation during 
decision making such that liberals deliberate more than conservatives when 
making decisions. 
 
 
The preferences between hedonic and utilitarian choice options, novel and status quo 
options, and feasible and desirable options are examined. Hedonic vs. utilitarian choices were 
selected as they are one of the most widely studied in consumer research. However, as 
choices are not always made in isolation it is important to also understand how political 
ideology impacts choice when there is an incumbent novel option. Finally, some choices also 
take time and effort to complete. Consumers must consider both the process and the outcome 
of the choice, thus preferences for feasibility vs. desirability of choices are germane to 
ideological differences. 
 
Hedonic vs. Utilitarian Options 
Consumers’ choices are often composed of deciding between hedonic and utilitarian 
options. Hedonic options can be described as more fun, exciting, and enjoyable, while 
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utilitarian options are more functional and useful (Hirschman and Holbrook 1982). While 
many products possess attributes on both the utilitarian and hedonic dimensions they 
typically are predominantly described as one or the other (Voss, Spangenberg, and 
Grohmann 2003). For instance, consider the purchase of a new vehicle. Potential utilitarian 
attributes of the vehicle could include price, gas mileage, and safety, while its hedonic 
attributes could include comfort, sound quality, and an aesthetic design.  
Here, utilitarian attributes are objectively comparable across multiple options (Babin, 
Darden, and Griffin 1994). Decisions based on utilitarian options are also more easily 
justified (Shafir, Simonson, and Tversky 1993). Conservatives’ high need for closure causes 
this ease of justification to be more appealing (Jost et al. 2003). The tendency for 
conservatives to engage in dogmatic thinking also makes it easier to see the value in the 
practicality of utilitarian options. Hedonic options, instead, are more ambiguous due to their 
subjective nature (Babin et al. 1994). Such ambiguity is better tolerated by liberals than 
conservatives, leading them to a higher preference for hedonic options. Additionally, liberals’ 
high openness to experience may cause the experiential nature of hedonic options to be more 
valued.  
The amount of deliberation used when deciding between hedonic and utilitarian 
options helps to explain the preferences of liberals and conservatives. Again, utilitarian 
options are more objective and hedonic options are more subjective and require more 
deliberation to consider. For example, it requires less deliberation and is thus easier to 
compare 20 MPG against 25 MPG or the number of calories in food than it is to compare a 
Bose sound system against Beats Audio or the taste of food. This suggests that it requires less 
deliberation to compare utilitarian options versus hedonic options (Botti and McGill 2011). 
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This helps explain why hedonic alternatives are preferred when decisions involve forfeitures 
instead of acquisitions, as forfeiture decisions require more elaboration (Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000). Additionally, consumers should be more likely to prefer hedonic options 
when they deliberate more, as this investment helps to justify their indulgence because they 
have earned it (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). As such, we expect that conservatives will prefer 
utilitarian options as they deliberate less when making decisions than liberals, who will 
prefer hedonic options as they deliberate more. Therefore, we predict that: 
 
 
H2: Political ideology impacts consumer choice preferences such that 
conservatives (liberals) will prefer options which are utilitarian (hedonic). 
 
H3:  Deliberation mediates the relationship between political ideology and choice 
preferences such that conservatives (liberals) will deliberate less (more) and 
be more likely to choose options which are utilitarian (hedonic). 
 
 
Novel vs. Status Quo Options  
Consumers are often presented with a choice between a product previously chosen 
and a new, lesser known option. Past research suggests that conservatives may have a 
stronger inclination for a status quo option, as they are more likely to defend and justify 
existing systems and are averse to inconsistency (Jost et al. 2003). Additionally, 
conservatives have been shown to be less motivated than liberals to adjust and correct 
previously formed opinions, once again indicating a desire to maintain the status quo (Skitka 
et al. 2002). Novel options also offer uncertainty, which conservatives would prefer to avoid. 
Conversely, liberals are more open to experience which leads them to exploring their 
environment and looking for what is new and unique, such as a novel option. This is echoed 
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by the finding that liberals’ homes and workspaces contain a larger variety of books and 
music than conservatives (Carney et al. 2008). These distinctions are consistent with Conover 
and Feldman’s (1981) characterization of conservatives’ desire to preserve tradition, 
especially when threatened by government involvement and liberals’ desire to support 
progress, even at the expense of government involvement. 
The selection of a status quo option requires less deliberation, characteristic of 
conservatives, as it relies heavily on familiarity and past experience (Eidelman and Crandall 
2009). Conversely, liberals should be more likely to select novel options as they deliberate 
more and deviate away from the familiar. For instance, consumers are more likely to seek 
variety when they spend more time evaluating a choice set (Mitchell, Kahn, and Knasko 
1995). Thus, we suggest that conservatives, through deliberating less, are more likely to 
prefer the status quo option, while liberals are more likely to diversify their choice through 
greater deliberation. Formally, we expect that: 
 
 
H4: Political ideology impacts consumer choice preferences such that 
conservatives (liberals) prefer options which are consistent with the status quo 
(novel). 
 
H5:  Deliberation mediates the relationship between political ideology and choice 
preferences such that conservatives (liberals) will deliberate less (more) and 
be more likely to choose options which are consistent with the status quo 
(novel). 
 
 
Feasibility vs. Desirability 
The feasibility and desirability of options in a choice set are often considered by 
consumers when making decisions, where the feasibility of an option refers to its means-
related attributes and the desirability of an option refers to its ends-related attributes 
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(Todorov, Goren, and Trope 2007). In other words, the end state of the option defines its 
desirability, while its feasibility is captured in how easy or difficult it is to reach the end state 
(Liberman and Trope 1998). The evaluation of feasible and desirable options has been a 
primary focus in construal level theory (CLT) research. Here, feasible options are represented 
more concretely, which suggests a low-level construal, while desirable options are perceived 
as more abstract, which suggests a high-level construal (Trope and Liberman 2010). Liberals 
should be more likely to prefer desirable options through their openness to experience, as this 
has been linked to abstract thinking (Carney et al. 2008). Conservatives should be more 
likely to prefer feasible options, as their dogmatic thinking leads them to focus on more 
specific, concrete characteristics. For instance, liberals have been shown to rate abstract 
paintings more favorably than conservatives, while conservatives rate more representational, 
or concrete, paintings more favorably (Shook and Fazio 2009). Thus, conservatives are 
predicted to prefer feasible options, while liberals are more likely to prefer desirable options.  
Research on CLT has also examined the manner in which feasible and desirable 
options are evaluated by consumers. Specifically, when comparing feasible and desirable 
attributes, the evaluation and weighting of feasible attributes is often consistent among 
consumers, while the weight assigned to desirable attributes is varied and often guides 
decisions (Todorov et al. 2007). Thus, feasible options are chosen when the desirable options 
are not deemed to be as important and desirable options are chosen when the desirable 
options are deemed important. Accordingly, it is expected that conservatives will focus on an 
evaluation of the feasible attributes for all options through their usage of less deliberation. 
This will guide their decision, leading to a preference for feasible options. Liberals, however, 
are expected to deliberate more which allows them to place a higher consideration on the 
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desirable attributes of the options than the feasible attributes. As such, the amount of 
deliberation used when making a decision between feasible and desirable options explains 
liberals’ preference for desirable options and conservatives’ preference for feasible options. 
This is consistent with the finding that those put in a deliberative mind-set are more likely to 
pursue a goal due to the value of its purported desirability (Heckhausen and Gollwitzer 1987) 
and to recall desirable attributes (Gollwitzer, Heckhausen, and Steller 1990); as well as Liu’s 
(2008) proposition that consumers make more desirable choices when deliberation is 
extended due to an interruption. In sum, we predict: 
 
 
H6: Political ideology impacts consumer choice preferences such that 
conservatives (liberals) will prefer options which are feasible (desirable). 
 
H7:  Deliberation mediates the relationship between political ideology and choice 
preferences such that conservatives (liberals) will deliberate less (more) and 
be more likely to choose options which are feasible (desirable). 
 
 
Plan of Studies 
We begin with study 1 which uses a non-student sample to investigate the reported 
and actual behaviors of adult consumers relative to their political ideology in a variety of 
decision contexts. Studies 2 and 3 then provide a more thorough and robust examination of 
these differences by employing different measures of political ideology and multiple choice 
sets to assess preferences of liberals and conservatives on hedonic and utilitarian options, 
novel and status quo options, and feasible and desirable options. Study 4 then tests the 
process mechanism of deliberation underlying the influence of political ideology on decision 
making. Finally, in study 5, levels of deliberation are experimentally manipulated, beyond 
13 
 
 
 
alternative explanations, to further demonstrate that deliberation is the underlying mechanism 
associated with differences in consumer choice across political ideology.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
METHODOLOGY 
 
STUDY 1 
 
Overview 
 Study 1 was conducted to examine the systematic choices made by liberals and 
conservatives. This initial demonstration of purchase behavior provides evidence of the 
breadth and pervasiveness of these unique consumer preferences relative to political 
ideology. While we build on these findings in subsequent studies, our primary goal here is to 
demonstrate that political ideology broadly impacts consumer decisions. 
 
Procedure 
 One hundred twenty-nine participants completed an online study using MTurk. 
Participants were notified that they were completing a study about their preferences and 
attitudes as consumers. Next, they were presented with several different choice tasks to 
complete. Here, participants expressed their preference for specific types of features by 
providing information about their most recent vehicle purchase. Preferences for their favorite 
restaurant were also elicited. Participants were then asked to describe a vacation they planned 
to take. Finally, participants completed a measure of political ideology along with control 
measures. Upon completion, the survey collected information about the computer the 
participant was using to complete the study. 
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Measures  
 Vehicle attributes. Participants were first asked if they had ever purchased a 
vehicle—those who had not did not participate in this task. The participants who indicated 
they had purchased a vehicle were then asked to describe their specific vehicle and to then 
indicate reasons why they made this purchase.  
 Restaurant Preferences. Participants were also asked to list their three favorite 
restaurants. Then, for each of these restaurants, participants coded the restaurant as being 
either a local, regional, or national restaurant/franchise. Participants then indicated their 
preference for the food they ordered at these given restaurants. Specifically, participants 
specified that they always ordered the same thing, tend to choose between a few things, or 
typically liked to try something new. 
 Vacation Intentions. Participants were also asked to provide information about the 
next vacation they are planning to take. Here, they were asked how much money they 
intended to spend on the vacation and how far away they planned on traveling. Traveling 
distance was assessed using a 5-point scale (1 = in my home state, 2 = in a bordering state, 3 
= in my region, but not a bordering state, 4 = out of my region, but in the country, 5 = out of 
the country).  
 Operating System Information. A behavioral measure was taken while participants 
completed the study. Specifically, we recorded the operating system that the participant had 
installed on the machine they were using to complete the study.  
 Political Ideology. A multi-item scale from Kidwell et al. (2013), which had been 
adapted from Nail et al. (2009), was used to measure political ideology. Items were measured 
on a seven-point scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree) and included perceptions 
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of capital punishment, abortion (pro-life), democrats, gun control, socialized medicine, same-
sex marriage, and illegal immigration (α = .80). The last five items were reverse coded. 
Lower scores represent a liberal ideology and higher scores represent a conservative 
ideology. This measure is presented in appendix a and follows a normal distribution 
(skewness = .476, kurtosis = .057. The frequency distribution for this measure is presented in 
figure 4.1.2. 
 Controls. As participants were collected from a variety of backgrounds, all analyses 
control for age and household annual income. Annual income was measured via an 8-point 
scale  (1 = <$10,000, 2 = $10,000 to $29,999; 3 = $30,000 to $49,999; 4 = $50,000 to 
$69,999; 5 = $70,000 to $89,999; 6 = $90,000 to $109,999; 7 = $110,000 to $149,000; 8 = 
$150,000+). 
  
Results 
 Participants in this study were recruited from across the United States (50.39% 
female). As such, in addition to assessing the effects of political ideology (M = 3.46, SD = 
1.33) on decision making, we consider the potential impact of other factors on decision 
making. Specifically, for all analyses described below, we control for the potential effects of 
age (M = 39.46, SD = 13.83) and annual household income (M = 3.43, SD = 1.61).  
 Vehicle Attributes. Two independent raters coded participants’ responses for why 
they purchased their most recent vehicle as either hedonic (e.g. body style, color, fun to 
drive) or utilitarian (e.g. price, safety, dependable). The total number of utilitarian thoughts 
was divided by the total number of thoughts for each participant. Thus, a lower percentage of 
utilitarian thoughts reflects a greater percentage of hedonic thoughts. The inter-rater  
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Figure 4.1.2 
STUDY 1: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
 
 
 
  
18 
 
 
 
reliability between the codings of the two raters was high (r = .87) and differences were 
resolved by a third rater. Regression results reveal a significant relationship between the 
percentage of utilitarian thoughts and political ideology where a greater proportion of 
conservatives’ thoughts were utilitarian, and a greater proportion of liberals’ thoughts were 
hedonic (β = .212, SE = .016, t = 2.30, p = .023). Those with a higher annual income were 
also more likely to generate more utilitarian thoughts (β = -.209, SE = .013, t = -2.28, p = 
.025), but age had no effect (β = .021, SE = .002, t = .231, p = .818). 
 Restaurant Preference. The prevalence of the restaurant organization (1 = local, 2 = 
regional, 3 = national) and the likelihood of participants to order the same thing or try 
something new was assessed for participants’ three favorite restaurants (1 = I always order 
the same thing, 2 = I tend to select only a few things, 3 = I typically like to try something 
new). Because each of these factors were measured using 3-point scales that followed an 
ordinal, rank order style, ordinal regression was used to assess the effect of political ideology 
onto restaurant preferences. 
 The 3-item measure of restaurant prevalence was summed across all three restaurants 
to create a composite score.  The same scoring procedure was used for restaurant menu 
choice. 
None of the control variables in the analyses had an effect on either restaurant outcome (ps > 
.10). Results from the ordinal regression analysis demonstrate that liberals were more likely 
than conservatives to not only prefer local restaurants over national chains (B = .317, SE = 
.125, Wald χ2 = 6.40, p = .011), but were also more open to trying new items on the menu 
instead of ordering the same thing (B = -.256, SE = .124, Wald χ2 = 4.29, p = .038). 
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 Vacation Intentions. Vacation intentions were assessed in terms of how much 
participants planned to spend on their next vacation (M = $1497.34, SD = $1191.88) and the 
distance they planned to travel (M = 2.86, SD = 1.36). Five participants were removed from 
this analysis as they had no desire to go on vacation. Political ideology, age, and income all 
had an effect on vacation spending where liberals were likely to spend more money (β = -
.205, SE = 79.13, t = -2.89, p = .005), those who have a higher annual income were likely to 
spend more (β = -.279, SE = 63.13, t = 3.17, p = .002), and older participants were likely to 
spend more money, but only marginally so (β = .155, SE = 7.54, t = 1.77, p = .079). Liberals 
were also more likely to travel farther away for their vacation (β = -.220, SE = .092, t = -2.39, 
p = .018). There were no effects of income or age on traveling distance (ps > .10).  
 Operating System. The Microsoft Windows operating system was coded as “1” (n = 
94), while all other operating systems were coded as “0” (n = 35). Logistic regression was 
used to estimate political ideology’s effect onto operating system choice. Conservatives were 
more likely than liberals to choose the Windows operating system (B = .438, SE = .172, 
Wald χ2 = 6.47, p = .011). Importantly the effect of income was marginally significant here 
in that those who earned less money were more likely to choose Windows as their operating 
system (B = -.242, SE = .126, Wald χ2 = 3.69, p = .055), while there was no effect for age (B 
= -.015, SE = .015, Wald χ2 = 1.01, p = .316). 
 Finally, each item of the political ideology measure was individually examined. 
These results are presented in table 4.1.4. Here, Pearson correlations are used for the 
continuous outcomes, Spearman correlations are used for the ordinal outcomes, and point-
biserial correlations are used for the dichotomous outcome.
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Table 4.1.4 
STUDY 1: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SINGLE ITEM RESULTS 
 
 
  
Capital 
Punishment 
Abortion     
(pro-life) 
Gun 
Control 
Socialized 
Healthcare 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Illegal 
Immigration Democrats 
Utilitarian Thoughts % .071 .150 .157* .187** .225** .061 .169* 
Restaurant Location -.284*** -.136 -.059 -.138 -.257*** -.111 -.043 
Restaurant Food Order -.160* -.155* -.125 -.082 -.245*** -.067 -.143 
Vacation Spending -.132 -.228** -.146 -.082 -.174** -.109 -.143 
Vacation Distance -.148 -.061 -.074 -.189** -.171* -.227** -.103 
Windows OS .142 .217** .154 .281*** .102 .232** .154 
* p < .10 
       ** p < .05 
       *** p < .01 
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Discussion 
 The results of study 1 illustrate that liberals and conservatives make systematically 
different decisions. Specifically, conservatives were more likely to provide utilitarian reasons 
for purchasing a vehicle while liberals were more likely to provide hedonic reasons. 
Conservatives were also more likely to make choices consistent with the status quo through 
the restaurant task where they were more likely than liberals to go to nationally recognized 
franchise restaurants and to order the same thing when they eat at these restaurants. 
Conversely, liberals were more likely to frequent local establishments and to try new things 
while eating out. This effect is further illustrated as conservatives were more likely to have 
Microsoft Windows installed as their operating system. Microsoft Windows is the dominant 
operating system in the marketplace, boasting about 90% of the market (Martin 2014), and as 
such is the clear status quo alternative. Finally, conservatives were also more likely to prefer 
feasible vacations which are closer to home and cost less, while liberals would rather go on 
more desirable vacations which involve traveling farther from home and spending more 
money. 
These results are demonstrated using an adult sample varying in age and income. 
Controlling for these factors, the effect of political ideology is shown to be more robust and 
prevalent. Additionally, these results are supported not only through self-reported past 
behavior, and future behavioral intentions, but also through actual behavior in the choice of 
participants' operating systems. 
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STUDY 2A 
 
Overview 
 Study 2a was conducted to build on the findings of study 1 and more systematically 
examine the predicted differences in decision making among liberals and conservatives. 
Specifically, conservatives are predicted to make choices that are more utilitarian, consistent 
with the status quo, and more feasible while liberals make choices that are more hedonic, 
novel, and desirable. 
 
Procedure 
 Participating for partial course credit, 82 undergraduate business students were 
informed that they were completing a study related to decision making where they would be 
presented with several choice tasks. The choice tasks are presented in appendix b. The order 
of these tasks was randomized for each participant. After completing the choice tasks, 
participants completed a measure of political ideology which was said to be part of an 
unrelated study. The political ideology measure, presented in appendix a, was last so as to 
avoid priming a particular ideology before the completion of the choice tasks.  
 
Measures 
 Hedonic/Utilitarian Preference. In one scenario, participants were told that they had 
received a reward from a restaurant. As part of the reward, participants were told they could 
choose between receiving one of two side items—a side salad or french fries. The healthy 
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option of a side salad represents a utilitarian option where the tastier option of french fries 
represents a hedonic option.   
 Novel/Status Quo Preference. Participants were also told that they were meeting their 
friends for dinner at their normal, typical restaurant, as they were used to doing. This week, 
however, one of their friends suggested a new, unfamiliar restaurant. In this scenario 
participants were then asked if they wanted to go to the normal restaurant—the status quo 
option, or if they wanted to try the novel option by going to the new restaurant.   
 Feasibility/Desirability Preference. In another scenario, participants were told that 
they had agreed to review one book and had two to choose from (Simonson and Sela 2011). 
The first book was the desirable option as it was 980 pages and promised to be interesting 
and inspiring. The second book was the feasible option as it was only 22 pages long, but was 
promised to be technical and dull. 
 Political Ideology. The multi-item scale from study 1 (Kidwell et al. 2013) was used 
to measure political ideology. Once again, lower scores represent a liberal ideology and 
higher scores represent a conservative ideology. This measure once again follows a normal 
distribution and the frequency distribution (skewness = .197, kurtosis = -.619) is presented in 
figure 4.2.2. 
 
Results 
 Each of the choice tasks were separately regressed onto political ideology (M = 4.26, 
SD = 1.28) using logistic regression. Once again, higher scores represent a conservative 
ideology. 
 
24 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2.2 
STUDY 2A: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
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 Hedonic/Utilitarian Preference. For the selection of the side item task, the healthy, 
utilitarian food option (n = 36) was coded as “0” while the tasty, hedonic food option (n = 
46) was coded as “1.” Here, political ideology significantly predicted preference for the  
hedonic or utilitarian food options (B = -.478, SE = .192, Wald χ2 = 6.177, p = .013). Liberals 
were more likely to prefer the hedonic food option while conservatives were more likely to 
prefer the utilitarian food option. 
 Novel/Status Quo Preference. For the restaurant selection task, the status quo option 
(the restaurant that was frequented; n =16) was coded as “0,” while the novel option (the new 
restaurant; n =66) was coded as “1.” Political ideology significantly predicted the choice task 
outcome (B = -.513, SE = .233, Wald χ2 = 4.836, p = .028). Specifically, conservatives were 
more likely to prefer the status quo restaurant while liberals were more likely to prefer the 
novel restaurant. 
 Feasibility/Desirability Preference. For the book review task, the book that was more 
feasible (short but dull; n = 43) was coded as “0,” while the book that was more desirable 
(long but interesting; n = 39) was coded as “1.” For this task, the book that was selected to be 
reviewed was predicted by political ideology (B = -.389, SE = .187, Wald χ2 = 4.347, p = 
.037). Liberals preferred to review the desirable book while conservatives preferred 
reviewing the feasible book. 
 Again, each individual item of the political ideology measure was examined for the 
results above. The results of the single item analyses are presented in table 4.2.4 as point-
biserial correlations.
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Table 4.2.4 
STUDY 2A: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SINGLE ITEM RESULTS 
 
 
  
Capital 
Punishment 
Abortion     
(pro-life) 
Gun 
Control 
Socialized 
Healthcare 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Illegal 
Immigration Democrats 
Utilitarian vs. Hedonic -.246*** -.327*** -.240** -.302** -.135 -.033 -.184 
Novel vs. Status Quo -.321* -.035 -.233 -.162 -.309** -.173 -.486** 
Feasibility vs. Desirability .176 .112 .144 .251* .205** .060 .250* 
* p < .10 
       ** p < .05 
       *** p < .01 
        27 
 
 
 
Discussion 
 The expectation that liberals and conservatives make systematically different choices 
was supported where liberals were more likely to prefer options which were hedonic, novel, 
and desirable, while conservatives were more likely to prefer utilitarian, status quo, and 
feasible options. These results support H2, H4, and H6. A potential limitation of this study 
was that we employed the Kidwell et al. (2013) measure of political ideology. To enhance 
the generalizability of our results, study 2b uses a distinct measure of political ideology to 
replicate the results demonstrated in study 2a.  
 
STUDY 2B 
 
Overview and Procedure 
 The primary purpose of study 2b was to replicate the results of study 2a on the same 
outcomes while using a different measure of political ideology. Thus, the procedure of study 
2b was identical to study 2a, except the right wing authoritarianism (RWA, α = .88, 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992) multi-item measure was used to assess political ideology 
on a 7-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = disagree. The measure is presented in appendix 
a. RWA describes a tendency for one to adhere to authority and social convention and has 
been used extensively in past research to assess political ideology across cultures (Burke, 
Kesloff, and Landau 2013, Jost et al. 2003). Higher values represent a conservative ideology. 
This new measure of political ideology also followed a normal distribution (skewness = -
.338, kurtosis = -.538) and its frequency distribution is presented in figure 4.3.1. Participating 
for partial course credit, 89 undergraduate business students completed this study. 
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Figure 4.3.1 
STUDY 2B: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
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Results 
 Logistic regression was used to examine the effect of political ideology (M = 3.23, SD 
= .860) onto choice preference. Additionally, the choice outcomes were coded in an identical 
way as in study 2a. 
 Once again, political ideology was predictive of the choice task outcomes. 
Specifically, liberals were more likely to prefer the hedonic food item (n = 49) while 
conservatives were more likely to prefer the utilitarian food option (n = 40; B = -.608, SE = 
.284, Wald χ2 = 4.575, p = .032). Conservatives were also more likely to prefer the status quo 
restaurant (n = 24) while liberals preferred the novel restaurant (n = 65; B = -.665, SE = .327, 
Wald χ2 = 4.131, p = .042). Finally, liberals were again more likely to prefer to review the 
desirable book (n = 44) while the feasible book (n = 45) was more preferred by conservatives 
(B = -.784, SE = .296, Wald χ2 = 7.032, p = .008). 
 
Discussion 
 Taken together, the results of studies 2a and 2b provide generalizability across 
different measures of political ideology supporting the notion that political ideology impacts 
the choices that consumers make. Moreover, the choices which are affected include those 
between hedonic and utilitarian options, novel and status quo options, and feasible and 
desirable options. In order to further enhance the generalizability of our results, studies 3a 
and 3b utilize a similar procedure as studies 2a and 2b, but conducted using new choice 
outcomes for each of the three decision tasks.  
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STUDY 3A 
 
Overview 
 To add generalizability to our findings that the choice preferences of conservatives 
and liberals are systematically different, study 3a uses a new set of choice outcomes in order 
to replicate the findings of studies 2a and 2b. Once again, conservatives are predicted to 
select utilitarian, status quo, and feasible options while liberals are predicted to prefer 
hedonic, novel, and desirable options. 
 
Procedure 
 Participating for partial course credit, 86 undergraduate business students completed a 
new set of choice tasks. As in studies 2a and 2b, the order of the choice tasks was 
randomized for each participant. The new choice tasks are presented in appendix b. Finally, 
under the guise of a separate study, participants completed a measure of political ideology. 
 
Measures 
 Utilitarian/Hedonic Preference. Participants were presented with a scenario where 
they were moving into a new apartment and had two apartments to choose from (Dhar and 
Wertenbroch 2000). The utilitarian apartment was described as being a 10-minute commute 
to work, but it overlooked a parking garage. The hedonic option, instead, was described as 
having a breathtaking view of the sunset and city skyline, but being a 45-minute commute to 
work. 
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 Novel/Status Quo Preference. Participants were also asked to imagine that they are 
currently invested in a fund which earns 7.1% interest and for the next year they had to 
choose whether to stay with the same fund or switch to a new fund. They were then presented 
with projections for the expected interest rate for each fund over the next year. Their current 
fund, the status quo option, was expected to earn 8.15%, while the new fund was expected to 
earn 8.65% and represented a novel option. 
 Feasibility/Desirability Preference. For the feasibility and desirability preference 
scenario, participants were told that they were purchasing concert tickets for a friend’s 
birthday that they would also be attending (Simonson and Sela 2011). Their friend told them 
about two concerts that the friend really wanted to go to. The feasible concert ticket was only 
$25, but it was for a band that the participant didn’t like, while the desirable ticket was for a 
band that the participant liked, but the ticket cost $55. 
 Political Ideology. The same multi-item political ideology measure from study 2a was 
used (Kidwell et al. 2013; α = .73). All items were coded such that higher scores represent a 
conservative ideology.  Once again, this measure follows a normal distribution (skewness = -
.483, kurtosis = .144) and the frequency distribution is presented in figure 4.4.2. 
 
Results 
Logistic regression was used to examine the relationship between political ideology 
(M = 4.42, SD = 1.00) and the choice task outcomes. As in the previous studies, higher scores 
represent a conservative ideology. 
 Utilitarian/Hedonic Preference. For the apartment selection task, the utilitarian 
apartment (shorter distance to work, n = 50), was coded as “0” while the hedonic apartment   
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Figure 4.4.2 
STUDY 3A: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
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(nicer view, n = 36) was coded as “1.” As in studies 2a and 2b, political ideology was 
predictive of preference between a hedonic and a utilitarian choice (B = -.482, SE = .240, 
Wald χ2 = 4.036, p = .045). Specifically, liberals preferred the hedonic apartment whereas 
conservatives preferred the utilitarian apartment.  
Novel/Status Quo Preference. For this choice task, the status quo option (choosing to 
stay with the same mutual fund, n = 43) was coded as “0,” while the novel option (choosing 
the new mutual fund, n = 43) was coded as “1.” Once more, political ideology significantly 
predicted preference for a novel or a status quo option (B = -.537, SE = .238, Wald χ2 = 
5.100, p = .024). Specifically, liberals preferred the novel, new mutual fund, while 
conservatives were more likely to stay with the same, status quo mutual fund. 
Feasibility/Desirability Preference. For the concert ticket selection task, the feasible 
tickets (less expensive, n = 20) were coded as “0,” while the desirable tickets (more liked 
band, n = 66) were coded as “1.” Political ideology was again predictive of choice preference 
such that liberals preferred the desirable concert tickets while conservatives preferred the 
feasible concert tickets (B = -.684, SE = .270, Wald χ2 = 6.421, p = .011). 
Point-biserial correlations were once again examined for each individual political 
ideology item. These results are presented in table 4.4.4. 
 
Discussion 
 The results of study 3a once again replicate the finding that political ideology impacts 
the choice preferences of consumers where liberals prefer hedonic, novel, and desirable 
options, while conservatives prefer utilitarian, status quo, and feasible options. Importantly, 
these results were found using different choice tasks than in studies 2a and 2b. Next, we 
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Table 4.4.4 
STUDY 3A: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SINGLE ITEM RESULTS 
 
 
  
Capital 
Punishment 
Abortion     
(pro-life) 
Gun 
Control 
Socialized 
Healthcare 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Illegal 
Immigration Democrats 
Utilitarian vs. Hedonic -.097 -.222* -.433*** -.138 -.348*** -.331** -.475*** 
Novel vs. Status Quo .092 .061 .227* .196 .187 .168 .162 
Feasibility vs. Desirability -.372*** -.047 -.164 -.152 -.069 -.193 -.075 
* p < .10 
       ** p < .05 
       *** p < .01 
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conduct study 3b to replicate the results using an additional measure of political ideology to 
enhance our confidence in these findings. 
  
STUDY 3B 
 
Overview and Procedure 
The primary purpose of this study was to replicate the results of study 3a using a 
different measure of political ideology. Therefore, this study uses the identical choice tasks 
from study 3a while using the RWA measure (α = .89) of political ideology from study 2b. 
Other than the change to the political ideology measure, the procedure of this study was 
exactly the same as study 3a. Again, the frequency distribution for the RWA measure is 
presented in figure 4.5.1 and it followed a normal distribution (skewness = -.396, kurosis = 
.845).  Here, 75 undergraduate business students participated for partial course credit. 
 
Results 
 Logistic regression was used to regress the choice preferences for the three choice 
tasks onto political ideology (M = 3.41, SD = .888) as in previous studies. The choice 
outcomes were also coded in an identical manner as study 3a. 
 Once again, political ideology was predictive of the choice task outcomes. 
Specifically, the utilitarian apartment (n = 43) was preferred by conservatives while the  
hedonic apartment was preferred by liberals (n = 32, B = -.687, SE = .299, Wald χ2 = 5.300, p 
= .021). Conservatives were also more likely to prefer the status quo investment fund (n = 
39) while the novel investment fund (n = 36) was preferred by liberals (B = -.686, SE = .301,   
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Figure 4.5.1 
STUDY 3B: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
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Wald χ2 = 5.205, p = .023). Lastly, liberals were more likely to prefer the desirable concert (n 
= 52) while conservatives were more likely to prefer the feasible concert (n = 23; B = -.684, 
SE = .339, Wald χ2 = 4.077, p = .043). 
 
Discussion 
 Studies 3a and 3b present consistent findings that liberals and conservatives make 
systematically different choices. Specifically, conservatives prefer options which are 
utilitarian, consistent with the status quo, and feasible while liberals prefer options which are 
hedonic, novel, and desirable. This prediction is supported using multiple measures of 
political ideology across various choice outcomes. Equally important to understanding the 
systematic differences in the decisions made by liberals and conservatives is uncovering the 
psychological process which underlies these differences. Recall we predicted that 
deliberation drives these differences, such that liberals are expected to deliberate more than 
conservatives when making decisions. Thus, the role of deliberation in the decisions made by 
liberals and conservatives is examined in study 4. 
 
STUDY 4 
 
Overview 
 Study 4 replicates and extends the findings of the previous studies by examining the 
amount of deliberation’s underlying effect on the relationship between political ideology and 
choice. Liberals are expected to deliberate more than conservatives and this difference is 
expected to lead them to make unique decisions. Potential alternative explanations to amount 
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of deliberation are also investigated for each choice task. Specifically, it is possible that 
liberals’ preference for hedonic options is driven by their enjoyment of emotionally laden 
options and not deliberation. It is also possible that conservatives’ need for structure is truly 
what leads them to selecting status quo options. The amount of thought, deliberation, is also 
distinguished from the type of thinking as the mediating mechanism by examining the 
attribute trade-offs made by participants. Finally, we assess whether construal level drives 
decisions between feasible and desirable options. Therefore, in addition to deliberation for 
each choice task, need for emotion, need for structure, and intolerance for ambiguity are also 
considered as explanations for their respective choice task. The alternative process 
explanation measures are presented in appendix a.  
 
Procedure 
 One hundred forty-six undergraduate business students completed study 4 for partial 
course credit. Similar to previous studies, participants began by completing a randomized set 
of choice preference tasks that were used in studies 2a and 2b. Except, this time, after 
completing each task participants were asked to list their thoughts regarding their decision in 
order to capture their level of deliberation for that given decision. Separate thought listings 
were performed for each of the three decision tasks. In addition, participants also reported 
their level of motivation for completing each of the choice tasks after each thought listing 
task as it is possible that their level of motivation impacts how much they deliberate. Next, 
measures for the potential alternative explanations were collected in a randomized order. 
Finally, participants completed the measure of political ideology used in studies 1, 2a, and 3a 
which was purported to be part of a separate study.   
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Measures 
 Choice Preferences. The same choice preference tasks used in studies 2a and 2b were 
used in this study. All choices were coded in the same manner as the previous study. 
 Deliberation. The number of thoughts a participant had while completing a choice 
task was used to assess deliberation (Wilson and Schooler 1991). After completing each 
choice task, participants were presented with individual text boxes where they were 
instructed to list all of their thoughts regarding the choice they had just made. They were also 
told to only list one thought per box and that they did not need to complete all of the boxes. 
 Thoughts were also coded by two independent raters for evidence of attribute trade-
offs for each of the thought listing tasks. Raters followed the protocol set forth by Drolet and 
Luce (2004). The ratings displayed high inter-rater agreement for the hedonic/utilitarian 
(93%), novel/status quo (96%), and feasible/desirable (84%) choice tasks. All disputes were 
resolved by a third rater. Here, any mention of trading one attribute for another was classified 
as a choice trade off. Similar to Drolet and Luce (2004) 13.8% of the total thoughts were 
coded as containing an attribute value trade-off. 
 Motivation. Participants’ motivation to complete each choice task was assessed using 
three items. Each item was scored on a 7-point scale: 1 = not at all motivated, not at all 
interested, not at all involved, 7 = very motivated, very interested, very involved.  
Need for Emotion. The need for emotion scale (NFE; Raman, Chattopadhyay, and 
Hoyer 1995) was used to assess participants’ enjoyment of using and interacting with 
emotional stimuli.  
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All 12 items were scored on a 7-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree and 
reverse coded (α = .91). 
Need for Structure. The personal need for structure (PNS; Neuberg and Newsom 
1993) scale was assessed using 12 items (α = .75). These items were scored on a 7-point 
scale: 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree. 
 Construal Level. Consistent with prior research on construal level (Alter, 
Oppenheimer, and Zelma 2010, Kim and John 2008) participants completed the behavior 
identification form (BIF; Vallacher and Wegner 1989). Participants were presented with 25 
target behaviors (e.g. reading) and two descriptions of each behavior where one alternative 
represented a high level construal (e.g. gaining knowledge) and one alternative represented a 
low level construal (e.g. following lines of print). Items were scored such that the number of 
high level responses were summed across target behaviors (KR20 = .73). 
 Political Ideology. The political ideology scale used in studies 1, 2a, and 3a was used 
once more (α = .72). As before, higher scores correspond to a conservative ideology. This 
measure once again follows a normal distribution (skewness = .184, kurtosis = .032) and the 
frequency distribution is presented in figure 4.6.2. 
 
Results 
The INDIRECT macro (Preacher and Hayes 2008) was used to examine the proposed effect 
of political ideology onto choice preferences through deliberation. This was employed as it 
allows for the estimation of dichotomous choice outcomes and properly accounts for the non-
normal distribution of thought listings (Zhao, Lynch, and Chen 2010). All analyses are 
reported consistent with the guidelines established by Zhao et al. (2010) and indirect effects  
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Figure 4.6.2 
STUDY 4: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
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were estimated with 1000 bias-corrected bootstrap samples and all confidence intervals are 
reported at 95%. 
Hedonic/Utilitarian Preference. Once again, the salad, the utilitarian food option, was 
coded as “0” (n = 71) while the French fries, the hedonic food option was coded as “1” (n = 
75). The results from previous studies were replicated as political ideology (M = 3.99, SD = 
.91) predicted choice where conservatives were more likely than liberals to select the 
utilitarian food option (c’ = -.388, SE = .192, Wald χ2 = 4.10, p = .043). Mediation analyses 
estimated the potential processes of deliberation (M = 2.75, SD = 1.31), need for emotion (M 
= 3.90, SD = 1.08), and attribute value trade-off simultaneously. Motivation was controlled, 
but it had no effect (B = .010, SE = .132, Wald χ2 = .01, p = .939). Conservatives were shown 
to deliberate less than liberals as they had fewer thoughts regarding the decision task (a = -
.249, SE = .118, t = -2.10, p = .038) while there was no effect of need for emotion (a = -.156, 
SE = .098, t = -1.60, p = .112) or attribute value trade-off (a = -.007, SE = .022, t = -.32, p = 
.748). Deliberation was also related to choice in that those who deliberated more were more 
likely to select the hedonic food option (b = .377, SE = .144, Wald χ2 = 6.92, p = .009). There 
was no effect of need for emotion onto choice (b = -.021, SE = .168, Wald χ2 = .01, p = .903) 
or attribute value trade-off (b = 1.262, SE = .834, Wald χ2 = 2.29, p = .130). The indirect 
effect of political ideology onto hedonic/utilitarian preference through deliberation was 
significant as the confidence interval did not include 0 (a*b = -.094, CI: -.213 to -.015) while 
the indirect effect through need for emotion (a*b = .003, CI: -.057 to .090) and attribute 
value trade-off was not (a*b = -.009, CI: -.801 to .051). The direct effect was also non-
significant (c = -.318, SE = .203, Wald χ2 = 2.45, p = .117). These results provide support for 
indirect-only mediation through deliberation, but not need for emotion, as the underlying 
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mechanism as its indirect effect was significant, but the direct effect was not (Zhao et al. 
2010). The presence of indirect-only mediation suggests that the mediator of deliberation is 
identified consistent with our conceptual framework and is similar to Baron and Kenny’s 
(1986) full mediation. 
Novel/Status Quo Preference. As in studies 2a and 2b, the status quo restaurant was 
coded as “0” (n = 36) while the new, novel restaurant was coded as “1” (n = 110). Once 
again, liberals were more likely than conservatives to select the novel option (c’ = -.467, SE 
= .220, Wald χ2 = 4.52, p = .034). The number of thoughts for this task (M = 2.99, SD = 1.37) 
were used as the measure for deliberation and were simultaneously examined as a potential 
mediator of this effect along with need for structure (M = 4.27, SD = .71) and attribute value 
trade-off. Political ideology was negatively related to deliberation (a = -.282, SE = .124, t = -
2.28, p = .024) where liberals deliberated more than conservatives, marginally related to need 
for structure (a = .126, SE = .066, t = 1.93, p = .056) where conservatives had a higher need 
for structure than liberals, and not related to attribute value trade-off (a = .014, SE = .017, t = 
.81, p = .418). Once again, motivation was controlled for, but it had no effect (B = .221, SE = 
.179, Wald χ2 = 1.53, p = .216). Even though conservatives were found to deliberate less and 
have a higher need for structure (b = -.224, SE = .285, Wald χ2 = .62, p = .432), only 
deliberation significantly predicted choice where greater deliberation led to the selection of 
the novel option (b = .547, SE = .200, Wald χ2 = 7.80, p = .005) while there was once again 
no effect of attribute value trade-off (b = 17.991, SE = 6424.460, Wald χ2 < .00, p = .998). 
Similarly, the indirect effect through deliberation was significant (a*b = -.154, CI: -.388 to -
.031) while the indirect effect through need for structure (a*b = -.028, CI: -.145 to .027) and 
attribute value trade-off was non-significant (a*b = .248, CI: -.337 to 1.155). When 
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accounting for these processes, the direct effect was non-significant (c = -.294, SE = .244, 
Wald χ2 = 1.45, p = .229). These results provide evidence of indirect-only mediation through 
deliberation, but not need for structure. 
Feasibility/Desirability Preference. Consistent with prior analyses, the feasible book 
was coded as “0” (n = 79) and the desirable book was coded as “1” (n = 67). The results from 
previous studies were replicated in that liberals were more likely than conservatives to prefer 
desirable options (c’ = -.379, SE = .192, Wald χ2 =3.88, p = .049). An investigation into 
deliberation (M = 2.58, SD = 1.14), construal level (M = 10.55, SD = 4.42), and attribute 
value trade-offs reveals that liberals were more likely to deliberate (a = -.210, SE = .105, t = -
2.01, p = .047), and to have a more high level, abstract construal (a = -.859, SE = .410, t = -
2.10, p = .038) than conservatives, but there was no difference in attribute value trade-offs (a 
= -.076, SE = .058, t = -1.31, p = .192). Here, motivation did have an effect as a covariate 
where those who were more motivated were more likely to select the desirable option (B = 
.532, SE = .152, Wald χ2 = 12.32, p < .001). However, while deliberation predicted choice 
where greater deliberation was associated with choosing the desirable option (b = .582, SE = 
.186, Wald χ2 = 9.77, p = .002), there was no effect of construal level (b = .038, SE = .044, 
Wald χ2 = .77, p = .382) or attribute value trade-off (b = -.151, SE = .299, Wald χ2 = .25, p = 
.614). Mediation analyses revealed a non-significant direct effect between the two potential 
mediators (c = -.150, SE = .219, Wald χ2 = .47, p = .493) with a non-significant indirect 
effect of construal level (a*b = -.033, CI: -.182 to .028) and attribute value trade-off (a*b = 
.012, CI: -.030 to .143). There was, however, a significant indirect effect of deliberation (a*b 
= -.122, CI: -.308 to -.006). Thus, deliberation is identified as the mediating process of 
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political ideology onto choice preference between feasible and desirable options. Construal 
level is excluded as a potential alternative explanation for this effect. 
Yet again the individual political ideology items were examined separately for effects 
onto these outcomes. These point-biserial correlations are presented in table 4.6.4. 
 
Discussion 
 Study 4 replicated the results from previous studies where liberals were shown to be 
more likely to select hedonic, novel, and desirable options while conservatives were more 
likely to select options which are utilitarian, status quo, and feasible. Additionally, 
deliberation was found to underlie these differences in decision making in each case where 
liberals deliberated more than conservatives. Deliberation, or the amount of thinking, was 
also shown to work apart from the type of thinking where deliberation was solely responsible 
for these effects. Empirical evidence for deliberation as the process mechanism persisted 
even when simultaneously examining potential mediating alternative explanations. In study 
5, an experimental manipulation of deliberation is used to provide further support for our 
conceptual model and mediating mechanism. In addition, we elucidate what happens when 
liberals are prompted to deliberate less and conservatives are prompted to deliberate more 
when making decisions.
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Figure 4.6.4 
STUDY 4: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SINGLE ITEM RESULTS 
 
 
  
Capital 
Punishment 
Abortion     
(pro-life) 
Gun 
Control 
Socialized 
Healthcare 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Illegal 
Immigration Democrats 
Utilitarian vs. Hedonic -.054 -.111 -.014 -.219*** -.141* -.063 -.176** 
Novel vs. Status Quo -.129 -.111 -.081 -.087 -.117 -.056 -.196** 
Feasibility vs. Desirability -.153* -.007 -.093 -.046 -.113 -.181** -.146* 
* p < .10 
       ** p < .05 
       *** p < .01 
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STUDY 5 
 
Overview 
The amount of deliberation (high, low, control) used when making decisions for each 
of the choice preferences (hedonic vs. utilitarian, novel vs. status quo, desirability vs. 
feasibility) was manipulated. In doing so, study 5 not only helps to demonstrate deliberation 
as the mechanism underlying the relationship between political ideology and decision 
making, but also offers practical implications for conservative and liberal decision making. 
 
Procedure 
Two hundred twenty-seven undergraduate business students completed the measures 
and tasks below for partial course credit. Participants were first presented with a deliberation 
manipulation (high, low, control). Next, participants completed three choice tasks that were 
previously used in studies 3a and 3b. The order of the three tasks was randomized for each 
participant. The amount of time taken to complete each decision task was also recorded as a 
manipulation check of deliberation. As an additional manipulation check, participants 
completed a thought listing task after completing the decision tasks. Deliberation was 
assessed after the choice tasks so as to not dilute the deliberation manipulation. Lastly, 
participants responded to the measure of political ideology used in studies 1, 2a, 3a, and 4, 
which was said to be part of a new, separate study.  
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Manipulation and Measures 
 Deliberation Manipulation. Participants read one of three manipulations adapted from 
Nordgren and Dijksterhuis (2009) concerning the amount of deliberation they were to use for 
the decision tasks. For the low deliberation condition (n = 77) participants were told that 
“research has shown that people can make more accurate judgments if they make quick 
decisions using very small amounts of deliberation. This means that for each of the tasks 
below you should use very little effort to generate your decisions and make quick decisions.” 
In the high deliberation condition (n = 76) participants were told that “research has shown 
that people can make more accurate judgments if they make very deliberative decisions. This 
means that for each of the tasks below you should use lots of effort to generate your 
decisions and to think through all of the possibilities.” Again, these manipulations were 
designed to only manipulate deliberation, or the amount of thinking, not what participants 
were thinking about or the type of thinking. This means that for each of the tasks below you 
should use lots of effort to generate your decisions and to think through all of the 
possibilities.” Participants in the control condition (n = 74) were simply told that they were 
now to complete a series of choice tasks. 
 Decision Tasks. Three decision tasks were completed for study 5. These tasks are 
identical to those used in studies 3a and 3b and can be found in appendix b.  
 Political Ideology. The 7-item political ideology scale (α = .72) was used as in studies 
1, 2a, 3a, and 4. Once again, higher scores represent a conservative ideology. The frequency 
distribution for this measure is presented in figure 4.7.2 and it followed a normal distribution 
(skewness = .457, kurtosis = .024). 
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Figure 4.7.2 
STUDY 5: FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTION OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
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 Deliberation Manipulation Checks. So as not to dilute the deliberation manipulation, 
no measures were collected overtly while participants completed the decision tasks. 
However, the time spent to complete each task was collected for each of the decision tasks at 
the task-level (Nordgren and Dijksterhuis 2009). Consistent with study 4’s measure of 
deliberation, a thought listing task was also completed as a second manipulation check. The 
thought listing protocol was the same as study 4, except participants were given additional 
text boxes as they were asked to list their thoughts regarding all three tasks.  
 
Results 
 The deliberation manipulation check revealed a successful manipulation of 
deliberation as those in the high deliberation condition reported higher levels of deliberation  
through the thought listing task (M = 3.68, SD = 2.68) than those in the low deliberation 
condition (M = 2.83, SD = 1.83, t(151) = 2.30, p = .023). The PROCESS macro (Hayes 
2013) was used to investigate the deliberation conditions on choice as it is capable of 
computing Johnson-Neyman points (Johnson and Neyman 1936) for dichotomous outcomes, 
also known as a floodlight analysis, at α = .05. Such points are crucial in the following 
analyses as there is no predicted interaction between political ideology (M = 4.04, SD = 1.01) 
and deliberation condition. We do not anticipate that the slopes of the different conditions 
will be different across political ideology. Instead, we expect that conservatives in the control 
group will make similar decisions to those in the low deliberation group, but different from 
those in the high deliberation group. We expect something similar for liberals, where those in 
the control group should make similar decisions as those in the high deliberation group, but 
different from those in the low deliberation group. Here, it is the floodlight analysis that 
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assesses these expectations. Specifically, the floodlight analysis illuminates the exact point of 
political ideology where choices are different among the deliberation groups instead of 
exploring differences at arbitrarily selected points (Spiller et al. 2013). Consistent with this, 
and the guidelines set forth by Hayes (2013), all of the reported logistic regression 
coefficients are unstandardized, and the high and low deliberation conditions were dummy 
coded where the control condition is the reference condition for each. Results for each of the 
decision tasks are presented in figure 4.7.4. 
 Hedonic/Utilitarian Preference. The manipulation of deliberation for the preference 
between hedonic and utilitarian options was successful as those in the high deliberation 
condition (M = 20.67 seconds, SD = 10.35) took significantly longer to complete the task 
than those in the low deliberation condition (M = 17.50 seconds, SD = 7.59, t(151) = 2.16, p 
= .033). The hedonic apartment was coded as “1” (n = 111) while the utilitarian apartment 
was coded as “0” (n = 116). Because the control group serves as the reference group for each 
dummy coding, the significant main effect of political ideology (β = -.736, SE = .273, z = -
2.70, p = .007) replicates the findings of previous studies in that liberals in the control group 
were more likely to select hedonic options while conservatives were more likely to select 
utilitarian options.  
Additionally, participants in the high deliberation condition (n = 48) were more likely 
to select the hedonic option than those in the low deliberation condition (n = 28, z = 3.31, p < 
.001). As displayed in figure 4.7.4a, the effects of political ideology onto choice preference 
were eliminated in both the high deliberation and low deliberation condition where political 
ideology did not affect choice (βHigh = -.210, SEHigh = .225, Wald χ2High = .87, pHigh = .352; 
βLow = -.058, SELow = .254, Wald χ2Low = .05, pLow = .820). Though not predicted, there was a 
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marginally significant interaction between political ideology and both the low deliberation 
condition (β = .620, SE = .374, z = 1.65, p =.098) and the high deliberation condition (β = 
.630, SE = .353, z = 1.79, p = .074). 
Floodlight analyses reveal a more definitive difference in choice across political 
ideology. Choices made by conservatives, specifically those scoring at or above 4.309 on the 
political ideology scale, as indicated by the Johnson-Neyman point, in the control condition 
differed specifically from those in the high deliberation condition. Similarly, choices made 
by liberals (J-N = 3.772) were significantly different between the control condition and low 
deliberation condition. As a whole, these results are consistent with the prediction that 
deliberation drives the selection of the preference between hedonic and utilitarian options as 
liberals and those in the high deliberation condition were more likely to select the hedonic 
option, while conservatives and those in the low deliberation condition were more likely to 
select the utilitarian option.  
 Novel/Status Quo Preference. The deliberation manipulation was also successful for 
the novel vs. status quo choice task as those in the high deliberation condition (M = 28.04 
seconds, SD = 14.67) once again took significantly longer to complete the task than those in 
the low deliberation condition (M = 22.62 seconds, SD = 9.44, t(151) = 2.72, p = .007). As in 
studies 3a and 3b, the novel investment fund was coded as “1” (n = 114) while the status quo 
investment fund was coded as “0” (n = 113). As displayed in figure 4.7.4b, the results of the 
main effect of political ideology replicate previous studies in that conservatives were more 
likely to select the status quo option while liberals were more likely to select the novel option 
(β  = -.556, SE = .253, z = -2.20, p =.028). The deliberation manipulation also significantly 
affected choice preference such that those in the high deliberation condition were more likely 
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to select the novel option (n = 48) while those in the low deliberation condition were more 
likely to select the status quo option (n = 29, z = 3.15, p = .002). The deliberation 
manipulation once again eliminated the effects of political ideology onto choice preference as 
the choices made by liberals and conservatives were not significantly different in either the 
high or low deliberation conditions (βHigh = -.045, SEHigh = .224, Wald χ2High = .04, pHigh = 
.842; βLow = -.050, SELow = .252, Wald χ2Low = .040, pLow = .842). No interaction effect was 
found for the high deliberation condition (β = .511, SE = .338, z = 1.51, p = .131) or the low 
deliberation condition (β = .505, SE = .357, z = 1.41, p = .157). 
Floodlight analyses also reveal that conservatives (J-N point = 4.644) in the control 
condition made significantly different choices than those in the high deliberation condition 
where those in the high deliberation condition were more likely to make novel choices. 
Similarly, liberals’ (J-N Point = 3.806) choices were also different between the control 
condition and the low deliberation condition where those in the low deliberation condition 
were more likely to choose the status quo option. These results provide additional support for 
the prediction that liberals and conservatives make different decisions and that deliberation is 
the underlying mechanism driving this difference. 
 Feasibility/Desirability Preference. Those in the high deliberation group (M = 18.32 
seconds, SD = 8.95) took longer to complete the choice task than those in the low 
deliberation group (M = 15.24 seconds, SD = 7.01, t(151) = 2.37, p = .019) supporting the 
deliberation manipulation. The feasible concert was coded as “0” (n = 59) while the desirable 
concert was coded as “1” (n = 168). As displayed in figure 4.7.4c, the results from our 
previous studies were replicated through a significant main effect of political ideology (β = -
.630, SE = .274, z = -2.30, p = .021) where conservatives in the control group were more 
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likely to select the feasible option while liberals in the control group were more likely to 
select the desirable option. Additionally, those in the high deliberation condition were more 
likely to select the desirable option (n = 64) than those in the low deliberation condition (n = 
49, z = 2.90, p = .004). In the low deliberation condition there was also no significant 
difference in the choices made by liberals and conservatives (β = -.126, SE = .254, Wald χ2 = 
.25, p = .619). Similarly, there was no significant difference between liberals and 
conservatives in the high deliberation condition (β = .026, SE = .299, Wald χ2 = .01, p = .93). 
There were no interactions between the control condition and the low deliberation condition 
(β = .504, SE = .373, z = 1.35, p = .177) and the high deliberation condition (β = .656, SE = 
.405, z = 1.62, p = .106). 
Floodlight analyses once again show that liberals (J-N point = 3.757) in the low 
deliberation condition were more likely to select the feasible option than those in the control 
condition. Additionally, conservatives (J-N point = 5.129) were more likely to select the 
desirable option in the high deliberation condition than the control condition. As with the 
previous tasks, these results provide further support for the choice preference differences 
between liberals and conservatives and that this difference is driven by deliberation. 
Once again, the single item point-biserial correlations were examined for the 
individual items in the political ideology measure. Here, only the control group was assessed 
as there were no effects of political ideology in the high or low deliberation condition. These 
results are presented in table 4.7.4. In each of the above instances the individual items 
predicted some outcomes, but not others. No individual item predicted every outcome and all 
outcomes were predicted by a different pattern of items across studies. Overall, this 
assessment provided greater confidence in the aggregate measure.
55 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7.4 
STUDY 5: POLITICAL IDEOLOGY SINGLE ITEM RESULTS 
 
 
  
Capital 
Punishment 
Abortion     
(pro-life) 
Gun 
Control 
Socialized 
Healthcare 
Same-Sex 
Marriage 
Illegal 
Immigration Democrats 
Utilitarian vs. Hedonica -.166 -.083 -.209* -.244** -.183 -.186 -.356*** 
Novel vs. Status Quoa -.293** -.305*** -.063 -.065 -.107 -.131 -.156 
Feasibility vs. Desirabilitya -.146 -.017 -.332*** -.174 -.316*** -.027 -.097 
a Only includes the control group 
      * p < .10 
       ** p < .05 
       *** p < .01 
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Discussion 
 The results of study 5 replicate and extend the findings from our previous studies. 
Specifically, liberals were more likely to choose hedonic, novel, and desirable options while 
conservatives were more likely to select options that were utilitarian, status quo, and feasible. 
These differences can be explained by the amount of deliberation used when making 
decisions where liberals deliberated more than conservatives for each task. Additionally, 
participants in the high deliberation condition exhibited liberal decision making tendencies 
for all three tasks while those in the low deliberation condition exhibited conservative 
decision making tendencies regardless of their political ideology. These results suggest that 
the decisions of conservatives and liberals can be altered by making them think more or less, 
respectively. These results also provide further support that deliberation is the underlying 
mechanism for the political ideology to choice preference relationship. 
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Figure 4.7.4 
STUDY 5: CHOICES 
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Figure 4.7.4 (continued) 
STUDY 5: CHOICES 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
 We proposed and tested a conceptual model of the underlying process driving 
consumer decisions, resulting from consumers’ political ideology. In doing so, we uncovered 
differences between liberals and conservatives systematic choice preferences. We found that 
the differences for all of these decision contexts were related to the amount of deliberation 
used when making a decision, where liberals deliberated more than conservatives. 
Importantly, recent research in deliberation has found that deliberation can have both positive 
and negative effects, dependent upon the decision at hand (Dijksterhuis et al. 2006, Dijkstra 
et al. 2012). Therefore, the overall, collective quality of the decisions made by liberals and 
conservatives was not expected to vary. These differences in the decision making tendencies 
between liberals and conservatives have several implications for consumers, marketers, and 
policy makers. These implications are discussed next. 
  
Choice Preference Implications 
 Liberals and conservatives differed in the options they preferred. For example, 
liberals were more likely to prefer and appreciate the experiential and enjoyable nature of an 
option while, conservatives were more likely to be drawn to the practicality and usefulness of 
an option. However, there are also times when liberals and conservatives could make the 
same selection, but for different reasons. For example, liberals and conservatives may 
purchase the same pair of athletic shoes, where liberals select the shoes based on their 
comfort and styling, while conservatives select the same shoes based on their durability and 
arch support. Thus, by understanding their own political ideology, consumers would better 
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understand their underlying preferences and know which product attributes are the most 
influential to them. 
 The current research additionally suggests that liberals are more likely to prefer novel 
products, where conservatives are more likely to maintain the status quo with their product 
preferences. This could lead to the perception that liberals are more likely than conservatives 
to try new products and services. While this may be true of radical innovations, this could 
also indicate that conservatives are more likely to adopt brand extensions (Oakley et al. 
2008). For instance, before Apple’s popularity boom, liberal consumers could have been 
more likely to try the iPod, while conservative consumers could have been more likely to try 
the iPad almost a decade later. As such, a marketer should consider not only its place in the 
market, but also the political ideology of its consumers.  
 When making decisions and pursuing goals, liberals are also more likely to focus on 
the desirability of the outcome, while conservatives are more likely to focus on the feasibility 
of the process. In this manner, conservatives and liberals could have different views and 
motivations of the same choice or goal. For instance, if a liberal and a conservative wanted to 
lose weight through eating more healthily, the way in which they view the feasibility vs. 
desirability preference affects how they accomplish this goal. A liberal would be more 
concerned with the desirability of becoming healthier and would be more likely to reach this 
goal if s/he focused on the value of losing weight such as living longer, feeling more 
attractive, and having more energy. In contrast, a conservative would be more concerned 
with the feasibility of the goal and would be more likely to reach this goal if s/he focused on 
the process of becoming healthier such as specific ways to eat better, learning how to cook 
healthy meals, and understanding portion control. Thus, consumers are more likely to reach 
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their goals and to make better decisions once they understand how their political ideology 
leads them to view the processes and outcomes involved with a specific decision. 
 The results of our research are also important for marketers and public policy makers, 
especially those whose mission involves helping consumers, such as wealth management 
firms, weight-loss centers, or sustainability initiatives (Kidwell et al. 2013). By 
understanding the political ideology of its consumers, these marketers can lead their 
customers to even greater success. For instance, a financial planner in San Francisco, CA 
would be better suited to explain the enjoyment that one can find in retirement as well as how 
painful it could be to not have enough saved. A financial planner in Provo, UT would instead 
be advised to inform clients of the steps required to build wealth, such as the best way to pay 
down debt and how to decide what proportion of income should be invested and where it 
should be invested.  
 
Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
 While this is one of the first papers in marketing to examine differences in decision 
making resulting from a consumer’s political ideology, this research is not without 
limitations. First, the idea that liberals deliberate more than conservatives might suggest that 
liberals are more likely to engage in system 2 processing while conservatives engage in 
system 1 processing. However, an investigation into the dual processing differences between 
liberals and conservatives is outside the scope of the current research. Instead, the 
deliberation differences discussed here are in the system 2 domain, with liberals taking more 
time to process analytically than conservatives. These deliberation differences are also choice 
dependent. For instance, a liberal may take a few minutes when contemplating the purchase 
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of a new laundry detergent, while a conservative may take only a minute. However, in 
considering the purchase of a new car, a liberal may take a week to make a decision while a 
conservative takes only a few days. Decisions with longer deliberation durations are worthy 
of future investigation. 
 Additionally, while this research shows that, in general, liberals deliberate more when 
making decisions than conservatives, there could be situations where conservatives deliberate 
more. For instance, as conservatives are more risk averse than liberals (Jost et al. 2009), 
situations that require an immense amount of risk could lead conservatives to deliberate more 
than liberals. Conservatives are also more sensitive to the opinions of their in-group (Graham 
et al. 2009), therefore, it is possible that they could deliberate more when buying a gift for a 
friend, especially if this gift will be presented in public. Consistent with Thaler and 
Sunstein’s (2009) notion of nudging consumers, liberals may need to be nudged to less 
hedonic options while conservatives may need to be nudged to avoid hyperopic tendencies 
(Haws and Poynor 2008) 
The current research examines political ideology and consumer choice preferences. 
However, there are potential other differences between the behaviors of liberals and 
conservatives. Perhaps liberals and conservatives make different financial decisions. It could 
be that one ideology is better at saving, while the other is better at reducing and avoiding 
debt. Perhaps political ideology affects the charitable behaviors of consumers (Brooks 2006, 
Winterich et al. 2012). These differences could come in a variety of ways such as who 
liberals and conservatives donate to, how much they give, and what they give. Political 
ideology could also impact the food decisions made by consumers. Conservatives could be 
more likely to follow strict rules and guidelines such as portion sizing suggestions and 
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specific diet plans while liberals could be more open to healthy food substitutions such as 
using honey as a sweetener instead of sugar or to try less conventional yet healthy foods such 
as quinoa and tofu. 
The current research lays the foundation for understanding the decision making 
differences between liberals and conservatives based on how much they deliberate for a 
given decision. The research demonstrates strengths and weaknesses for both sides of the 
political aisle. In discussing these differences, we presented an objective view for each 
ideology and encourage future research to explore the broad differences between liberals and 
conservatives to further our understanding of this emerging area.  
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APPENDIX A 
Political Ideology Measures 
 
Political Ideology (Kidwell, Farmer, and Hardesty 2013) 
(1 = strongly against, 7 = strongly favor)  
1. Capital punishment 
2. Abortion (pro-life) 
3. Gun control (R) 
4. Socialized healthcare (R) 
5. Same-sex marriage (R) 
6. Illegal immigration (R) 
7. Democrats (R) 
 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992) 
1. Our country desperately needs a mighty leader who will do what has to be done to 
destroy the radical new ways and sinfulness that are ruining us. 
2. Gays and lesbians are just as healthy and moral as anybody else. (R) 
3. It is always better to trust the judgment of the proper authorities in government and 
religion than to listen to the noisy rabble-rousers in our society who are trying to 
create doubt in people’s minds.  
4. Atheists and others who have rebelled against the established religions are no doubt 
every bit as good and virtuous as those who attend church regularly. (R) 
5. The only way our country can get through the crisis ahead is to get back to our 
traditional values, put some tough leaders in power, and silence the troublemakers 
spreading bad ideas. 
6. There is absolutely nothing wrong with nudist camps. (R) 
7. Our country needs free thinkers who have the courage to defy traditional ways, even 
if this upsets many people. (R) 
8. Our country will be destroyed someday if we do not smash the perversions eating 
away at our moral fiber and traditional beliefs. 
9. Everyone should have their own lifestyle, religious beliefs, and sexual preferences, 
even if it makes them different from everyone else. (R) 
10. The “old-fashioned ways” and the “old-fashioned values” still show the best way to 
live. 
11. You have to admire those who challenged the law and the majority’s view by 
protesting for women’s abortion rights, for animal rights, or to abolish school prayer. 
(R) 
12. What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil, and 
take us back to our true path.  
13. Some of the best people in our country are those who are challenging our 
government, criticizing religion, and ignoring the “normal way things are supposed to 
be done.” (R) 
14. God’s laws about abortion, pornography and marriage must be strictly followed 
before it is too late, and those who break them must be strongly punished. 
15. There are many radical, immoral people in our country today, who are trying to ruin it 
for their own godless purposes, whom the authorities should put out of action. 
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16. A “woman’s place” should be wherever she wants to be. The days when women are 
submissive to their husbands and social conventions belong strictly in the past. (R) 
17. Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers, do what the 
authorities tell us to do, and get rid of the “rotten apples” who are ruining everything. 
18. There is no “one right way” to live life; everybody has to create their own way. (R) 
19. Homosexuals and feminists should be praised for being brave enough to defy 
“traditional family values.” (R) 
20. This country would work a lot better if certain groups of troublemakers would just 
shut up and accept their group’s traditional place in society. 
 
Alternative Explanation Measures 
 
Need for Emotion (Raman, Chattopadhyay, and Hoyer 1995) 
1. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance of getting 
emotionally involved. (R) 
2. Experiencing strong emotions is not something I enjoy very much. (R) 
3. I would rather be in a situation where I experience little emotion than one which is 
sure to get me emotionally involved. (R) 
4. I don’t look forward to being in situations that others have found to be emotional. (R) 
5. I look forward to situations that I know are less emotionally involving. (R) 
6. I like to be unemotional in emotional situations. (R) 
7. I find little satisfaction in experiencing strong emotions. (R) 
8. I prefer to keep my feelings in check. (R) 
9. I feel relief rather than fulfilled after experiencing a situation that was very emotional. 
(R) 
10. I prefer to ignore the emotional aspects of situations rather than getting involved in 
them. (R) 
11. More often than not, making decisions based on emotions just leads to more errors. 
(R) 
12. I don’t like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that is emotional in 
nature. (R) 
 
Need for Structure (Neuberg and Newsom 1993) 
1. It upsets me to go into a situation without knowing what I can expect from it. 
2. I’m not bothered by things that interrupt my daily routine. (R) 
3. I enjoy having a clear and structured mode of life. 
4. I like to have a place for everything and everything in its place. 
5. I enjoy being spontaneous. (R) 
6. I find that a well-ordered life with regular hours makes my life tedious. (R) 
7. I don't like situations that are uncertain. 
8. I hate to change my plans at the last minute. 
9. I hate to be with people who are unpredictable. 
10. I find that a consistent routine enables me to enjoy life more. 
11. I enjoy the exhilaration of being in unpredictable situations. (R) 
12. I become uncomfortable when the rules in a situation are not clear. 
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Behavior Identification Form (Vallacher and Wegner 1989) 
Making a list    
a. Getting organizeda    b. Writing things down 
 
Reading    
a. Following lines of print   b. Gaining knowledgea 
 
Joining the Army   
a. Helping the Nation's defensea  b. Signing up 
   
Washing clothes   
a. Removing odors from clothesa  b. Putting clothes into the machine 
 
Picking an apple  
a. Getting something to eata   b. Pulling an apple off a branch 
 
Chopping down a tree  
a. Wielding an axe    b. Getting firewooda 
 
Measuring a room for carpeting  
a. Getting ready to remodela   b. Using a yard stick 
 
Cleaning the house  
a. Showing one's cleanlinessa  b. Vacuuming the floor 
 
Painting a room  
a. Applying brush strokes   b. Making the room look fresha 
 
Paying the rent  
a. Maintaining a place to livea  b. Writing a check 
 
Caring for houseplants  
a. Watering plants    b. Making the room look nicea 
 
Locking a door  
a. Putting a key in the lock   b. Securing the housea 
 
Voting  
a. Influencing the electiona   b. Marking a ballot 
 
Climbing a tree  
a. Getting a good viewa   b. Holding on to branches 
 
Filling out a personality test  
a. Answering questions   b. Revealing what you're likea 
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Toothbrushing  
a. Preventing tooth decaya   b. Moving a brush around in one's mouth 
 
Taking a test  
a. Answering questions   b. Showing one's knowledgea 
 
Greeting someone  
a. Saying hello    b. Showing friendlinessa 
 
Resisting temptation  
a. Saying "no"    b. Showing moral couragea 
 
Eating  
a. Getting nutritiona    b. Chewing and swallowing 
 
Growing a garden  
a. Planting seeds    b. Getting fresh vegetablesa 
 
Traveling by car  
a. Following a map    b. Seeing countrysidea 
 
Having a cavity filled  
a. Protecting your teetha   b. Going to the dentist 
 
Talking to a child  
a. Teaching a child somethinga  b. Using simple words 
 
Pushing a doorbell  
a. Moving a finger    b. Seeing if someone's homea 
 
aHigher level alternative 
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APPENDIX B 
 
Study 2a and 2b Choice Sets 
 
Hedonic/Utilitarian Preference 
 
Imagine that you are eligible for a reward at a local restaurant. You are given a choice 
between two side items. The rewards are listed below. 
 
Reward A: Side Salad 
Reward B: French Fries 
 
Which reward would you choose? 
 
Novel/Status Quo Preference 
 
Imagine that you meet your friends once a week at the same restaurant to hang out and have 
dinner. This week, one of your friends suggests a new restaurant that you have never been to.  
 
Would you rather try the new restaurant or go to your normal restaurant? 
 
 
Feasibility/Desirability Preference 
 
Assume that you have agreed to review one book. You can select one of two books to 
review: 
 
Book A is 980 pages long and promises to be interesting and inspiring. 
Book B is 22 pages long and promises to be technical and dull. 
 
Which book would you prefer to review? 
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Study 3a and 3b Choice Sets 
 
Hedonic/Utilitarian Preference 
 
Imagine that you will be moving into a new apartment and you face a decision of renting one 
of the two apartments described below. Both apartments are similar in all other relevant 
aspects (e.g. rent, safety, features). 
 
Apartment I: Has a breathtaking view of sunset and city skyline with a 45-minute drive to 
work. 
Apartment II: Overlooks a large parking garage with a 10-minute drive to work. 
 
Which apartment would you choose? 
 
Novel/Status Quo Preference 
 
The fund you are currently invested in now earns 7.1% interest. For next year, you have to 
choose whether to stay with the same fund or to switch to a new fund by checking a box on a 
form. The only information you have about the two funds is the expected rate of interest for 
the next year. These expected rates of return are only predictions; the actual rates could be 
higher or lower than predicted. Your options are: 
 
Option A: Stay with the same fund, expected to earn 8.15%. 
Options B. Switch to a new fund, expected to earn 8.65% 
 
Which option would you choose? 
 
Feasibility/Desirability Preference 
 
Your friend's birthday is coming up and you have decided to purchase concert tickets for the 
two of you to celebrate. Your friend told you that they really wanted to go to 1 of 2 upcoming 
concerts.  
 
Concert A features a band you like and tickets cost $55 each.  
Concert B features a band that you do not like and the tickets cost $25. 
 
Which concert would you want to attend with your friend?  
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